Clarifying Doubts on the Precept Against Sexual Misconduct for Lay Buddhists

Some people have doubts regarding the precept against sexual misconduct in the Sūtra on the Five Precepts for Upāsakas. Here, we shall jointly explain the original context to resolve these doubts and clarify the matter.

Original text: Should an upāsaka engage in sexual intercourse with a prostitute without paying the fee, he commits sexual misconduct, an unpardonable offense. If he pays the fee, there is no offense.

The original text means that if an upāsaka engages in sexual intercourse with a prostitute without paying the fee, he commits the highest category of unpardonable offense. This part is clear. The doubt lies in the latter part: paying the fee results in no offense. Some interpret this to mean that paying the fee avoids the highest category of unpardonable offense, implying that paying the fee might still constitute a medium or minor category of pardonable offense.

This raises the question: what is the difference between paying and not paying the fee? In both cases, sexual intercourse occurs. Does paying the fee reduce the severity of the offense? Does the severity of the offense depend on payment? By this logic, would compensating the family of a murder victim exempt the murderer from hell? Can hell be bought off with money? Clearly, this is untenable. Similarly, whether one pays or not, sexual intercourse has occurred. If it constitutes an offense, can the severity truly be divided based on payment? Can money determine the gravity of an offense? Evidently not. Karma is not a matter of money but of intention and consequence. Therefore, the correct interpretation here is that paying the fee results in no offense at all—there is no distinction between major or minor offenses.

Why is this so? In ancient India, prostitution was a profession—what might now be called an industry. It was openly operated, legal, and regulated, not only permitted by law but also protected by it. Why was it legal and protected? Due to the socio-economic conditions of the time: on one hand, some women were forced by poverty, lacking means of sustenance, to resort to prostitution for survival; on the other, polygyny left some men unable to find wives, compelling them to seek prostitutes. To address these issues and stabilize society, the prostitution industry emerged.

Thus, for an upāsaka who has taken the Five Precepts, paying for sexual intercourse did not violate national laws, regulations, or customs. It was purely a transactional act between consenting parties, socially accepted and recognized, not contravening secular norms—hence, not a breach of precepts. If society did not accept such behavior or if laws forbade it, then sexual intercourse, regardless of payment, would constitute a criminal offense.

To determine whether an act is "misconduct," one need only define what is "proper." What falls outside "proper" is "misconduct." "Proper" refers to what is collectively permitted by worldly laws, national conditions, and customs—what society deems acceptable. "Sexual misconduct," then, denotes sexual acts that violate laws or lack social and customary approval. If paying for sex were deemed an offense, then polygyny would likewise be illegal and unreasonable—yet upāsakas engaging in lifelong sexual relations with multiple women were not considered offenders. If a state or society forbade polygyny or polyandry, then polygamous upāsakas or polyandrous upāsikās would be deemed precept-breakers and criminals. But if polygamy was socially accepted and not criminalized, then paying for sex was not an offense.

To some extent, the Buddha formulated the Hīnayāna precepts in accordance with secular customs and social norms; otherwise, sentient beings would reject them, defeating the purpose of guiding them. For instance, had the Buddha required upāsakas, like bhikkhus, to abstain entirely from sexual activity and marriage, what ordinary person—mired in desire—would dare pursue Buddhist practice? Even if this were the ideal, imposing it on ordinary people who cannot accept it would be unwise. Otherwise, all Buddhists would renounce household life like monastics, erasing the distinction between lay and monastic practitioners.

As national conditions and customs evolve with societal development, the implications of precepts must adapt accordingly. Certain precepts applicable in ancient times may not apply today and must be revised. Ancient societies practiced polygyny or polyandry, whereas monogamy is the modern legal and socially normative standard. Within this framework, sexual relations are "proper"; beyond it, they constitute "misconduct." Yet in ancient times, the prostitution industry was also regulated and customary—paying for sex with a prostitute was compliant and legal, hence not sexual misconduct.

The original sūtra text does not suggest that paying for sex avoids the highest category of unpardonable offense. Personal conjectures do not represent the Buddha’s intent. Interpreting sūtras and precepts must align solely with the Buddha’s intent, not with any individual’s view—regardless of their renown. This is the fundamental principle of expounding Buddhist scriptures. The Buddha established precepts based on the customs and regulations of contemporary societies, never departing from social ethics and moral norms. Should these conditions change, the Buddha’s precepts would likewise change. Precepts conflicting with societal laws would be invalidated—as the Buddha explicitly stated in the Vinaya. For example, in ancient India, women held no independent status and were subordinated to men; thus, a man could renounce household life and give away his wife and children without her consent. Were the Buddha to propagate the Dharma in today’s world, He would never permit such an act.